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Abstract 
The United Nations (UN) is an international organization created from the express consent of 
states and established upon a multilateral international treaty between those states in order to 
perform the functions of promoting international peace and security, aid in the development of 
international relations, promote human rights, and aid in “harmonizing actions” between nations. 
The most ardent of these functions falls to the UN Security Council due to its responsibility for 
maintaining peace and security. UN peacekeeping missions were originally an alternative to 
collective security but they have evolved into Peace Support Operations (PSO) and are deployed 
with a strategy and mission in mind that will coordinate the multitude of organizations joining in 
to support the society undergoing a complex emergency. Evaluations of PSOs is imperative in 
order to effectively provide policy makers with the knowledge necessary to improve strategy and 
resource allocation for future PSOs.  
 
Introduction  
International agreements between states have led to the creation of the United Nations 
(UN) and its six organs which facilitate diplomacy and moderate conflict. Of these six organs, 
the UN Security Council has been noted as the most ambitious due to their primary function 
being to maintain international peace and security (Janis, 2008, p. 215). Maintaining peace and 
security is an extensive and rigorous process which includes numerous practices but most 
notable are peace support operations. The peace support operations of today have changed 
drastically since the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal in 1944 which laid the original principles and 
 
 
PCS (Spring 2015) 22(1), pp. 60-80 
PCS Webpage: http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/ 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 22, Number 1 
61 
organization for the establishment of the UN and its organs. UN peace operations have evolved 
over several generations from peacekeeping, to peacemaking, to peace support operations which 
incorporate peace enforcement capabilities. “Louis Henkin has written that in relations between 
nations, the progress of civilization may be seen as movement from force to diplomacy, from 
diplomacy to law” (Rochester, 2012, p. 261). I argue that because the world is constantly 
changing, the movement of force to diplomacy, and from diplomacy to law needs to take one 
step farther. An evaluation of the law needs to be continually undergone in order for the law to 
evolve and grow with the changing needs of the world. This means an evaluation process needs 
to be utilized for the peace support operations of today in order to determine what constitutes a 
success or failure of a peace support operation. This will, in turn, set the building blocks for the 
knowledge needed to make international policy. Evaluations will provide policy makers with an 
analysis of the effectiveness of a mission, allow for improvement, and offer an understanding of 
resource allocations and strategy (Diehl & Druckman, 2010, p. 202). 
The Creation of the United Nations 
The UN is an international organization whose legal roots are founded in the law of 
treaties. The law of treaties states the accepted rules about the making, the affect, amendment, 
invalidity, and termination of agreements among states. The law of treaties has its roots in 
customary international law which is where international organizations ground their legal effect 
among nations. International organizations are created from an express consent of states and are 
established upon a multilateral treaty agreed upon by states. These international organizations are 
created to fulfill specific designated functions in international relations. In order for international 
organizations to legally perform these functions, states delegate some of their sovereign powers 
to these international organizations. International organizations have become forums for 
negotiating international issues (Janis, 2008).  
The institution of the United Nations is an international organization that was developed 
from a failed League of Nations through a post-World War II desire to develop a working 
international entity that would be able to aid in the facilitation of diplomacy and moderate 
conflict. The UN Charter established six main organs: the Security Council, the General 
assembly, the International Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat, 
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and the Trusteeship Council. These organs work together to carry out the four main purposes of 
the UN: 
 “to maintain international peace and security; 
 to develop friendly relations among nations;  
 to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights; 
 to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations” (United Nations Security Council, 
2014, para. 2). 
An Ambitious Organ: The United Nations Security Council  
Mark Westin Janis has referred to the UN Security Council as “the most ambitious of the 
United Nations’ organs, having ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security’” (Janis, 2008, p. 215). When the UN Security Council receives a complaint 
they encourage that the parties try to reach an agreement through peaceful means. This is a 
multifaceted process which begins with parties agreeing to principles for a peaceful agreement 
and committing to investigation and mediation. When necessary it can escalate to the dispatch of 
a mission, appointment of special envoys, or to request the Secretary-General to use his offices 
to promote peaceful dispute settlements. If a dispute is hostile, the Council will require a 
complete cessation of violence and dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force. The 
Council can enact Chapter VII of the UN Charter and mandate enforcement measures which are 
economic sanctions, use of arms, embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, travel bans, 
severance of diplomatic relations, blockades, and collective military action (United Nations 
Security Council, 2014).  
Peacekeeping was originally an alternative to collective security. The UN could 
essentially create a space where negotiated solutions to conflicts could occur while military 
troops kept the opposing sides separated. It was thought that during this cessation of conflict the 
UN could help with conflict resolution and conciliation (Caldwell & Williams, 2012). 
Generational Evolution of Peacekeeping 
First generation peacekeeping was the peaceful settlement of disputes and enforcement. 
They operated on the premise of: consent of all parties, political neutrality, impartiality 
(commitment to the mandate), the non-use of force except in self-defense and finally, legitimacy 
(sanctioned by and accountable to the Security Council advised by the Secretary General). These 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 22, Number 1 
63 
peacekeeping missions sought to monitor borders and buffer zones after a ceasefire. During the 
Cold War thirteen of these peacekeeping missions were enacted (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & 
Miall, 2011) 
Immediately after the Cold War, the weakening state of countries previously occupied by 
regional powers could be seen. “No longer were ethnic groups within the superpowers’ areas 
limited with their ambitions to gain nation status nor were nations reluctant to challenge the 
arbitrary lines drawn on colonial maps” (Woodhouse, & Ramsbotham, 2000, p.64). Herein 
complex emergencies emanate. Intra-state conflict becomes the norm as opposed to inter-state 
conflict. With this weakening of the state came the decline in human rights, the destruction of 
social and cultural institutions and the rise of warlords. The Cold War peacekeeping missions 
could not adequately accommodate the rapid growth of conflict worldwide. The function and 
composition of the peacekeeping operations changed from monitoring after a ceasefire to 
covering security, humanitarian, and political objectives. These peacekeeping missions were 
second generation. The number of countries who participated in peacekeeping operations tripled 
from 1980’s-1990’s. Peacekeeping operations became more diversified by utilizing more sources 
such as military, civilian police, and took a diplomatic approach. But with the ever increasing 
problems of lack of protection for its workers, genocide, killings, and human rights violations the 
peacekeeping missions found “that faced with attempts to murder, expel, or terrorize entire 
populations, the neutral, impartial and mediating role of the UN was inadequate” (Ramsbotham 
et al., 2011, p. 151). 
These were the precursors for today’s peacekeeping operations. Third generation 
peacekeeping missions reflect the change peacekeeping operations needed to undergo in order to 
handle the current complex emergencies that are simultaneously occurring worldwide. While 
there is debate on the effectiveness of the means which are deployed in carrying out these 
operations it is known that global support is needed in order to transform and reconcile conflict 
of today. The peacekeeping missions of today are referred to as Peace Support Operations (PSO) 
and are deployed with a strategy and mission in mind that will coordinate the multitude of 
organizations joining in to support the society undergoing a complex emergency. The PSO 
covers both the peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, “but now used more widely to 
embrace in addition those other peace-related operations which include conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance” (Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 2000, 
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p.71). Early engagement in a PSO mission will make the investment more cost effective as well 
as affect the likeliness of long term success of the mission. PSOs operate on the basis of 
neutrality taking on the role of a third party conciliator and are designed to enforce a safe 
environment where entities can come into a complex emergency and began their peace process. 
Differences in third generation PSOs are that consent is no longer required and they can utilize 
Peace Enforcement (PE) doctrine to enforce cooperation of the peacekeeping mandate. The end-
state of peacekeeping is to have a secure and self-sustaining environment within the society. 
The complexities of conflict today require the peacekeeping process to become more 
complex and rigorous in order to transform society. It is not acceptable to stand by and allow 
human rights and a lack of human security to ensue. Though we cannot expound a definite recipe 
that will work for every conflict emergency we can continually strive to work for transformative 
solutions that will allow for a growth process that will build from the ground up. As Kofi Annan 
has stated, each individual is entitled to have “freedom from fear (through conflict management 
and resolution), freedom from want (through economic development and growth) and sustaining 
the future (through careful husbanding of the earth’s resources and ecosystems)” (Ramsbotham, 
& Woodhouse, 2000, p. 163). It is the duty of the international community to continually strive 
to help those who cannot help themselves. 
Evaluating Peace Support Operations to Determine the Effectiveness of International 
Policy  
Research on peacekeeping has mainly focused on the practicality of conflict management 
and resolution with the primary importance being what works and not on how or why it worked. 
The UN and militaries have a focus on “lessons learned” in order to discern what success is and 
what will improve future operations. Explicit evaluative measures need to be provided in order to 
understand what constitutes success and what the process to achieve that success was. An 
important note to make is that not every peace support operation can be evaluated by the same 
standards because not every peace support operation is the same. For example, peace support 
operations deployed to support civil wars will not have the same standards as peace support 
operations deployed to support interstate conflicts. “A proper specification of peace operation 
success thus yields a number of policy making benefits” (Diehl, & Druckman, 2010, p.6). Policy 
makers will be able to make valid inferences about the conditions associated with success, 
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provide a multifaceted assessment, and provide a baseline in order to make judgment and 
international policy changes (Diehl, & Druckman, 2010). 
The success of international peace support operations can be determined through a 
variety of perspectives. According to Evaluating Peace Operations, by Paul F. Diehl and Daniel 
Druckman (2010), five dimensions of evaluation decisions need to be considered. They are: the 
stakeholders, time perspectives, baselines, “lumping,” and mission types. We will explore these 
five dimensions and then discuss what Diehl and Druckman consider to be core goals of success 
and a framework for assessment of those goals as applied to MINUSTAH. 
Case Study: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti is an ongoing mission which began in 
June 2004 and is continuing to the present day. It is a transformative result stemming from a 
Multinational Interim Force (MIF) which began in February 2004 after the military coup ousted 
and caused the democratically elected president of Haiti, Bertrand Aristide, to be exiled. Security 
Council Resolution 1542 was enacted on 1 June 2004 to:  
aid in securing the rule of law, to enable a stable environment for the transitional 
government, to restructure the Haitian police force, to aid in public safety and order, to 
aid in Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs, to prevent 
violence, and support the constitutional and political processes, to assist in municipal 
organizational process, public elections, and support and assist the government and 
human rights institutions (“MINUSTAH Mandate,” 2004). 
The devastation caused by the 12 January 2010 earthquake left an already unstable 
society in shambles. The earthquake caused two hundred twenty thousand deaths. Because of the 
severity of the occurrence, the United Nations Secretary General proposed an increase in support 
levels to aid in the recovery, reconstruction and stability endeavors (“Restoring a secure and 
stable environment,” 2013).  
A Brief Haitian History 
Haiti has a long history of strife, repression, and revolutionary efforts. In 1804, after a 
thirteen year rebellion, the African slave population overthrew the wealthy landowner and 
political leaders, gained their independence, and created the nation of Haiti. This was the first 
slave population to gain control of their society which created fear of possible revolts in other 
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slave owning nations. Haiti is the world’s oldest black republic and the world’s second republic 
in the Western Hemisphere, the United States being the first. Haiti’s independence movement 
was feared by other Western countries and was not even recognized by the United States until 
the 1960’s after the country abolished slavery (“Haiti: A history of misfortune,” 2010).  
In 1844 Haiti split from its western side, Santo Domingo, which became the Dominican 
Republic. Haiti was isolated from market links to other countries because of the fact that it was a 
black free state which was detrimental to its economy.  
There was no indigenous capital with which to construct the infrastructure necessary to 
trade with the wider world. Nor was it possible to fund the educational system necessary 
to provide the human capital required to improve the range of products produced 
domestically (“Haiti: A history of misfortune,” 2010).  
While still a slave nation sugar was the exported product of the country but after the revolution 
there was no slave population to farm the sugar cane. The lands were subdivided and used for 
sustenance farming. 
Twenty two changes in government occurred in Haiti from 1843-1915 which marked a 
time of political and economic disarray that left a legacy for the next century. Because of this 
political and economic disorder, the United States occupied the country for nineteen years and 
finally left 1934. A series of dictators ran the country after until 1957 when a father and son duo, 
Francois Duvalier and Jean-Claude Duvalier, ruled until 1986. During this time frame the 
country was corrupt, over run with violence, and rampant with warlordism (“Haiti: A history of 
misfortune,” 2010). Upon the completion of the Duvalier family dictatorship, a constitutional 
government was ratified in 1987 which made provisions for an elected government and also 
provided political decentralization of the local government which allowed for the elections of 
mayors and administrative bodies to run the localities (“1987 Constitution of Haiti,” 2011).  
Provisional bodies ran the government from 1987 until the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 
December 1990. Aristide won what was seen, internationally, as a fair and free democratically 
run election with a sixty-seven percent vote. A violent coup overthrew Aristide once he took 
government and caused his exile. Violence and corruption ensued which contributed to every one 
in eight Haitian nationals to flee from the country (“Haiti’s history,” 2011).  
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 22, Number 1 
67 
United Nations Intervention in Haiti: Background (“MINUSTAH background,” 2013) 
While the provisional government was holding their elections in 1990, they requested the 
involvement of a United Nations observers group in order to verify the elections process 
(ONUVEH). After the military coup the United Nations along with the organization of American 
States (OAS) deployed to aid the country in February 1993. By September 1993 Haiti’s first 
United Nations peacekeeping operation was organized by the Security Council called, the United 
Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). This mission was unsuccessful due to the Haitians lack of 
military cooperation. This type of UN peacekeeping mission began as a second generation 
mission because the UN was invited in to monitor and handle the political objectives of the 
Haitian diplomatic process but evolved into a third generations peace support operation 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2011).  
Because of the UNMIH failure the UN Security Council enacted a multinational series of 
peacekeeping missions, from 1994-2000, which deployed a force of twenty thousand that would 
“return the legitimate Haitian authorities, maintain a secure and stable environment in the 
country, and promote the rule of law” (“MINUSTAH background,” 2013, para. 2). This was a 
quick development into a third generation peacekeeping process resulting from the lack of peace 
enforcement which affected mission capabilities. Third generation peacekeeping allows for troop 
deployments to abate violence, achieve conflict containment and promote conflict settlement 
(Ramsbotham, et al., 2011). Developments made during this timeframe were the positive 
proactive advancement of democracy, and the growth of civil society. Though growth and 
progression were seen, some residual issues remained such as regression of implemented reforms 
to the political crisis and stability to the country that never took hold. Insurgency broke out in 
Gonaives and spread over the northern part of the country. The Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1529 in February 2004 to authorize the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) which 
would stabilize and secure the environment in order to continue support of a peaceful political 
process.  
The MIF transformed into the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) on 30 April 2004 upon the recommendation from the UN Secretary-General. The 
mandated goals of MINUSTAH were 
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to support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable environment; to 
assist in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police; to help with 
comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) 
programmes; to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public 
safety and public order in Haiti; to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, 
installations and equipment and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence; to support the constitutional and political processes; to assist in organizing, 
monitoring, and carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential 
elections; to support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights 
institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights; and to 
monitor and report on the human rights situation in the country (“MINUSTAH 
background,” 2013, para. 6). 
Between 2004 and 2009 adjustments to the mandate were made in order to adapt to the 
changing needs on the ground and great progress was made towards all areas of the mandated 
goals. Setbacks to Haiti came when the devastating earthquake hit on 12 January 2010. Because 
of the devastation caused by the earthquake, all progress previously made under MINUSTAH 
was halted. Nation-building and presidential and municipal elections previously set into place 
were stopped which added to the uncertainty and unrest of the state. MINUSTAH was no longer 
a functioning program because one hundred and two UN personnel were killed in the earthquake 
to include the UN Special Representative and his principal deputy. Because of this, the priorities 
of the mandate changed. The UN Secretary General reported on the situation and the need for 
relief efforts, security, and restoration of the state. Endorsement of the Secretary General’s report 
came on 19 January under Resolution 1908 which increased force levels of MINUSTAH to 
support recovery, stabilization, and reconstruction in Haiti not only for short term recovery help 
but for long term reconstruction (“MINUSTAH background,” 2013).  
Resolution 1927 was enacted on 4 June 2010 which gave additional police and troops to 
aid with Haitian recovery but clearly stated that along with the surge in troop and police aid, the 
government of Haiti needed to take primary responsibility for stabilization and development, 
MINUSTAH was solely there as a supportive role. Requests for Office of the Coordination for 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to provide support in humanitarian and recovery efforts along 
with the OAS to help support continued international electoral assistance were made as well. 
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MINUSTAH’s success was seen in the March 2011 elections where the technical, logistical and 
administrative assistance proved rewarding. Michael Martelly was elected into office and 
transitioned smoothly. Renewing Haitian economy and further strengthening the rule of law was 
still necessary. A year after the earthquake, the fragility of security in Haiti still resounded. The 
UN Security Council passed Resolution 2012 in October 2011 which called for a drawdown in 
forces but allowed for the continuing support in Haiti. Because of the smooth transition from one 
elected President to the other and continuing progress in the nation, Resolution 2070 was passed 
in October 2012 which further reduced forces to accommodate the growing stabilization in Haiti 
(“MINUSTAH background,” 2013). 
Using Evaluating Peace Operations (Diehl, & Druckman, 2010) to Analyze the Evolution of 
the United Nations MINUSTAH Resolutions in Haiti 
1. The Stakeholders 
The first in the five dimensions of evaluative decisions are the stakeholders. As we 
consider all the stakeholders contributing to a peace support operation we also need to consider 
that each of the stakeholders will have a different definition of the success of the peace support 
operation. The international community represents a large piece. These are third party 
stakeholders such as states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO’s). Their goals can be varied but include stopping the spread of conflict across borders, 
aiding the development of international norms such as human rights and cooperative securities, 
and promoting world values. The interactions from the international stakeholders can include the 
promotion of political stakes and will entail certain states promoting sides to ensure that certain 
groups are recognized and considered during the peace process. Troop contribution to a peace 
support operation can have vested interests from their state of origin and can contribute to the 
determining factor of success (Diehl & Druckman, 2010). 
A particularly relevant subset of interested states assume leading roles in peace 
support operations and/or contribute personnel to the peace support 
operation…there is some debate over whether states contribute troops for 
altruistic, power and status, or pecuniary reasons, but once troops are deployed, 
contributors have vested interests in protecting those troops. (Diehl & Druckman, 
2010, p.13) 
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This can change the assessment values of a peacekeeping operation from containment of the 
spread of the conflict and promoting human securities to ensuring that one’s troops participating 
in the peace support operation are not harmed. This is particularly relevant when the domestic 
audiences of a state are watching, through the use of media, the outcome of conflict. Poorer 
states contributing troops to a peace support operation could have priorities that are not altruistic 
in nature. Sometimes these states are looking for the training, experience and financial payments 
that the UN can provide their troops. This takes the main focus away from the conflict resolution 
process needed in the area and brings the focus to the international community contributing to 
the peace mission (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).  
An example of this occurrence in Haiti is shown in the article Canadian Army Troops 
Return Home from UN Mission in Haiti. The article discusses how Canada sees the importance 
of a Canadian platoon deploying with a Brazilian battalion in order to strengthen their 
partnership with Brazil. “Brazil is an important partner for Canada. This deployment has been an 
excellent opportunity to deepen our defence relationship with the Brazilian Armed Forces and 
further strengthens the connection between our people” (“Canadian Army Troops,” 2013, para. 
1). 
NGO’s can have bureaucratic interests when it comes to peace support operations 
because they vie for funding and resources from outside entities. Their perception of success will 
be related to how they participate in the peace support operation and how they acquire their 
funding and resources. Beyond funding and resources, NGO’s are concerned with the assessment 
of their reputations because, “when peace operations denigrate the reputation of an organization, 
its other missions may suffer” (Diehl& Druckman, 2010, p.14). 
There are over three thousand NGO’s working to aid in Haiti’s recovery which has given 
the country a nickname of “The Republic of NGO’s” (Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010, para. 1). 
Because of the intense amount of aid coming from multiple directions without a centered 
leadership, Haitians were looking to the NGO’s for all support instead of their government. This 
in itself is defeating of the original mandated purpose from the UN which sought to strengthen 
the governmental capacity. This problem was heightened following the 2010 earthquake.  
Haiti’s government has been criticized for not taking a more visible role in responding to 
people’s needs following the earthquake. If projects implemented by NGO’s do no match 
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up with the government’s priorities, the long-term success of recovery efforts will be 
undermined. (Kristoff, et al., 2010)  
Even though the Haitian government does not have the resources to directly implement 
the required programs that will aid in its nation’s recovery, it does have the ability to oversee the 
NGO’s activities which will not only ensure that NGO work aligns with the governments goals 
but will also serve to strengthen the government. This is in alignment with the initial goal 
mandated in MINUSTAH (“MINUSTAH mandate,” 2013). One example of NGO’s non-
alignment issues is funding. Outside entities are afraid to give the government money to 
implement funding so they funnel the money through the NGO’s. Because the NGO’s have more 
funding than the government the Haitian people look to the NGO’s for support and not their 
government. This “perpetuates a cycle of low capacity, corruption and accountability among 
Haitian government institutions” (Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010, para. 2). Since NGO’s have the 
funding they can hire local people at a higher wage than the government. Though this is 
appealing for the Haitian people, it is not sustaining in the long run because eventually the 
NGO’s will leave and take their jobs with them. If the government was providing jobs then it 
would mean long term employment for nationals.  
After the 2009 donor’s conference a slow transition to provide funding through the 
government began. This notion is further expanded by Localising Aid: A whole Society Approach 
(Glennie & Rabinowitz, 2013). The authors of this document seek to express the importance of 
utilizing a Whole of Society (WoS) approach. This approach states that all key stakeholders need 
to be involved in the solution of the issue. This entails constant communication between NGO’s, 
international governments, local governments, and the people. This lack in communication is one 
of the primary flaws seen today. WoS also states that donors and NGO’s need to participate in 
government led strategies. Allowing NGO’s unfettered entrance into the area undergoing 
peacekeeping is chaotic and needs to be centralized and in alignment with the goals of the local 
society while allowing for engagement in information sharing (Glennie & Rabinowitz, 2013). 
The primary protagonists within the conflict hold an interest in the redistribution of goods 
but they usually do not agree on how they should be redistributed. This can be problematic 
during a conflict resolution process because, though a cease-fire has been called and negotiations 
for the redistribution of goods has begun, it is possible that the only reason protagonists are 
participating is to allow themselves time to rearm in order to start fighting again. In times of civil 
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war and intrastate conflict, the actors participating in the conflict can be very diverse which 
makes a fair dividing of the goods more difficult especially when each side wants a zero-sum 
outcome. Issues with Haitian primary protagonists initially lied within the gangs and other 
various violent groups of the nation who wished to oppose the government (“Report of the 
secretary-general,” 2004). These gangs and groups are impeding the success of the mission by 
importing small arms, are violent against the local government, and are involved with human and 
drug trafficking.  
Finally, the local population in an area of conflict will have their own interests and 
interpretations of what a successful peace support operation is. The presumption is that the 
cessation of conflict will improve the lives of the population but this is not the entirety of the 
conflict resolution process as it relates to the people. Issues that have arisen during peace support 
operations caused by the entities that are supposed to help the population are: the inability to 
repatriate refugees, creation of distortions to the local market economy; and the incidence of rape 
and spread of disease from the peace soldiers.  
The Haitian local population has a legacy of issues that will need to be addressed over 
generations. Many programs have been implemented to address their needs but their ability to 
resonate and stick will only be seen over time. Instilling democratic desires in the people of Haiti 
was slow in coming because they lacked the will to participate. This has slowly changed over 
time and success can be seen by the participation in the May 2011 election and by the successful 
transfer in power between presidents (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2004; “MINUSTAH 
Background,” 2013). Attracting outside investors in the Haitian economy is slow and difficult to 
come because of the devastation caused by the 2010 earthquake but movements are being made 
to entice foreign investors (“Jatropha Foundation,” 2009). In order to deter the incidences of 
abuse caused by international troops, the UN Secretary-General has requested that international 
militaries give a no tolerance policy against those external actors who sexually exploit or abuse 
persons in order to prevent cases of misconduct and require that personnel are properly 
investigated and punished (Resolution 2119, 2013). 
2. Time Perspective 
Next in the evaluative framework is the perspective of time which can be viewed in 
short-term and long-term success. Since MINUSTAH is a long term and transformative 
peacekeeping operation that has had a devastating natural disaster occur during its nine year 
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mission we will be evaluating it by looking at changes that have occurred over time. Long-term 
success is assessed by looking at the peace support operation for several years to decades after 
the operation has ended. It is based on policy interventions that influence behaviors which can 
only be assessed on the effects those behaviors have over an extended length of time. Long-term 
perspectives will lead to other assessments when various stakeholders undergo changes as shown 
in evaluating baselines (Diehl & Druckman, 2010). 
 MINUSTAH has not ended but has seen success which is shown in the drawdown of 
international troops and the successful transfer of government during recent presidential 
elections (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2013). 
MINUSTAH has seen great setbacks because of the 2010 earthquake but recuperation 
and recovery are still underway. According to the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General in Haiti, the stabilization of Haiti is currently underway but is still fragile. “Enduring 
political stability is the key to strengthening the country’s governance institutions, promoting 
socio-economic development, and attracting foreign investment” (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012, 
p. 3). 
Promoting the Rule of Law and counteracting corruption is of primary importance. This 
entails promoting democratic governance, the police force, and justice programs. This will 
secure the legal and physical security of the local population so that stabilization of the country 
will occur. When the country is perceived as stable, investments, economic growth and 
development will grow (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012). 
Good institutional governance is being promoted through the launch of the national 
coordination framework of external development aid in Haiti (CAED) which aids in the progress 
of government reforms. This will be enacted at all levels of government to include national 
government, department level and community level government (“Haiti Moving forward,” 
2012). 
Housing and urban development will be expanded and safer building practices will be 
adopted to help strengthen the structural capacity of the buildings to prepare for possible future 
natural disasters. Displaced individuals need to be repatriated to homes after construction. Along 
with this, disaster risk reduction will aid with the problems erosion and deforestation which 
impact frequent flooding during hurricane and cyclone season (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012).  
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Health education and treatments will continue through state and non-state actors so that 
significant progress will continue with nutrition, preventing the spread of HIV-AIDS, and aid 
with the fight of the cholera outbreak. This will require supporting expanded access to clean 
water and sanitation. Continued humanitarian action over the long term has significantly helped 
with all the above listed programs but it is necessary to continue it because the difficulties have 
not ceased within the nation (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012). 
With the widespread poverty and high unemployment rates along with slow economic 
growth, job creation is a central problem. An unemployed population is more likely to participate 
in crime. Creating projects and jobs that employs the population is a priority (“Haiti Moving 
forward,” 2012).  
Finally, due to the lack of public infrastructure, school fees, and an uneven distribution of 
schools throughout the country, educating the population is very difficult. The UN and the 
Haitian government have been working closely together in order to increase access to education, 
regulate the education system, abolish fees and define educational standards for state non-state 
service providers (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012). 
These have all been necessary changes made over time. It will take generations to recover 
from the hardships that have occurred within the country. Many lessons have been learned from 
the organization and conduction of MINUSTAH which are shown in Lessons Learned in Haiti 
such as the need for incorporating Whole of Society (WoS) techniques and practices (Glennie & 
Rabinowitz, 2013). Though progress and stabilization has been slow, it can still be seen by the 
continual positive outcomes. 
3. Establishing a Baseline 
Establishing a baseline is a necessity for effective assessments of a peace support 
operation. You must first define what you are comparing the peace support operation to (Diehl & 
Druckman, 2010). The assessment of MINUSTAH is done in a longitudinal analysis to show the 
slow but positive changes that are being made. Even after the crisis caused by the 2010 
earthquake which physically devastated the country and all progress made with social-political 
activities, the continual involvement and support provided has, overtime, made positive 
contributions to the Haitian society (“MINUSTAH facts and figures,” 2013; “Report of the 
secretary-general,” 2013). Also, the idea of Haiti being a “Republic of NGO’s” has promoted 
change in how future peace support operations are conducted as seen in how new documents 
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have appeared discussing the importance of governments aligning goals, sharing information, 
and communicating with NGO’s in order to perform and achieve in a shorter period of time 
(Glennie & Robinowitz, 2013; Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010). 
4. Lumping 
The next dimension of assessment is understanding “lumping” and how each element 
therein should be assessed. Peace support operations are a compilation of multiple procedures 
and processes such as size, training, strategy, tactics, time horizons, clarity and change of 
mandate, involvement with civil society, and host country and constituent support. These 
processes are “lumped” together in the peace support operation. These factors make it difficult to 
assess which one if not all pieces are contributing to the success or failure of an operation. 
General evaluations focus on the success of the whole rather than separating each part for 
assessment in order to prevent possible problems that arise from an assessment of a single part. 
But, knowing which factors contributed to the success of an operation can be imperative for 
understanding how to implement new peace support operations (Diehl & Druckman, 2010). 
Since MINUSTAH is a long-term peace support operation that has spanned from 2004 to 
the present lumping will be required in order to assess the full progress of the peace support 
operation. To this day there have been challenges with the recovery to the Haitian society which 
were greatly heightened due to the devastation caused by the 2010 earthquake. But there is 
unending hope for the people who live there. Success can be seen by analyzing the facts of the 
strength of the forces aiding in Haiti. Personnel aid provided by the MINUSTAH mandate in 
April 2004 was 6,700 military personnel, 1622 police, 548 international civilian personnel, 154 
UN volunteers, and 995 local civilian staff. In October 2009, 6,940 military personnel and 2,211 
police personnel were provided. In June 2010, after the earthquake numbers were increased to 
8,940 military personnel and 4,391 police in order to aid in the reconstruction. In October 2011, 
success was seen which allowed for the number of military and police personnel to drop to 7,340 
military personnel and 3, 241 police personnel. In October 2012, the drawdown continued to 
reduce numbers to 6, 270 military personnel and 2,602 police. Finally, in October of 2013, 
numbers once again were reduced to 5,021 military personnel and 2, 601 police which indicates 
that there is gradual success in handing over power to the Haitian government while slowly 
decreasing the need for international forces (“MINUSTAH facts and figures,” 2013). 
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5. What type of Peace Support Operation is MINUSTAH and what are the Core Goals 
of the Operation? 
Determining what type of peace mission you are looking at will determine how you 
analyze that peace mission. Different peace support operations have different goals so when 
deciding how to analyze an operation you must first ascertain what the goal or goals of the 
operation are then formulate key questions to evaluate the outcome of mission effectiveness. 
Analysts recommend using guidelines in the operations mandate of the mission because they 
contain specific tasks, requirements and benchmarks (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).  
Core goals of a peace support operation mission are violence abatement, conflict 
containment, and conflict settlement. Violence abatement is a reduction or complete cessation of 
armed violence and the prevention or the reoccurrence of violence. Conflict containment is 
preventing the spread of violence into new geographic areas. Conflict settlement is creating a 
conducive environment necessary in order to resolve issues and positions of the conflict 
participants. Peripheral goals of a peace support operation mission are election supervision, 
democratization, humanitarian assistance, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
(DDR), and human rights protection. Other peripheral goals that fall under the peacebuilding 
umbrella are local security, the rule of law, local governance and restoration, reconciliation and 
transformation (Diehl & Druckman, 2010). 
In order to define a mission as successful, you must first identify what the specific core 
and peripheral goals are in a peace mission, these are usually found in the mandate. The next step 
would be to identify measures that will check the progress of each goal and identify the benefits 
and limitations of those measures. Finally, analyze the extent to which those goals were achieved 
or not achieved. There can be a mixed record of success or failure depending on how well the 
goals were defined, what variables interceded with the measurements of success, and the 
interpretations of each of the parties (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).  
Currently MINUSTAH is a large multidimensional peacekeeping operation which 
includes over three thousand NGO’s, the UN, the OAS, UNISUR, and CARICOM partnering 
with the national government and people of Haiti. The goals according to the MINUSTAH 
mandate (Resolution 2119, 2013) are as follows: MINUSTAH will continue in the resolution 
process it has enacted since 2004 to further deploy 5,021 troops and 2,601 police that will 
continue to aid the Haitian government in a transitional partnership configured from the security 
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situation on the ground in Haiti. The forces given will continue to aid in maintaining a secure and 
stable environment. This will in turn strengthen the Haitian state capabilities of national police, 
national authorities, and state responsibilities. A drawdown in troop size shows that there is a 
success increase in the Haitians state abilities to conduct these aspects on their own but a full 
withdrawal cannot occur as of yet because the stability is still fragile. Since considerable 
progress has been made, the secretary general has proposed that in 2014 MINUSTAH be 
replaced with a smaller more focused mission (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2013). This is a 
sign of successful peacekeeping. 
MINUSTAH places importance on allowing the primary responsibility of the nation’s 
stability on the government to include logistical and technical expertise along with 
decentralization efforts so that the capacity of the national and local governments will enhance 
State authority throughout the country and will promote good governance and rule of law. As 
part of this the political actors will need to work cooperatively to complete the necessary steps of 
electoral law so ensure free, fair, and transparent senatorial, municipal, and local elections that 
comply with the Haitian constitution. The continued electoral assistance is coordinated by 
MINUSTAH with the Haitian government, OAS, the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). These same stakeholders are to also 
support women’s political participation which is accorded by the Haitian constitution 
(“MINUSTAH mandate,” 2004; “Report of the Secretary-General,” 2013). 
Continual support of the Haitian National Police is needed to ensure that the force grows 
to a minimum of 15,000 fully operational police officers by 2016. This includes all logistical and 
administrative capacities that law enforcement entails with accountability to the rule of law. This 
will include law enforcement accountability and respect for human rights, enhanced vetting and 
recruitment procedures, strengthened land and maritime border patrol, and deterrence from 
transnational organized crime. Justice reforms are encouraged to deal with the issues of 
prolonged pre-trials, prison conditions and overcrowding (“Report of the secretary-general,” 
2013). 
MINUSTAH stresses that donors and the Haitian government need to communicate, 
facilitate and coordinate to enhance the effectiveness of the HNP. Coordination with 
international actors is encouraged to enhance their programs to inhibit gang violence, organized 
crime, drug trafficking and trafficking of persons especially children. This will help to end the 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 22, Number 1 
78 
impunity within the country which is currently impeding the process in Haiti. Increased 
coordination efforts are called between all donors, partners, and international NGO’s to work 
through the Haitian governments Coordination of External Aid (CAED) which will insure 
increased transparency, national ownership and increase the government’s ability to manage the 
assistance given (“Report of the Secretary-General,” 2013). 
Increased and renewed efforts need to be made at developing improved living conditions 
especially for women and children, which will also aid in decreasing the gender based violence 
against women and children from gangs and the widespread incidences of rape and other sexual 
abuses. MINUSTAH is encouraged to keep protecting internally displaced persons in camps by 
jointly patrolling the camps utilizing Haitian national forces and international forces as well. The 
Secretary-Generally is explicitly requesting to give a no tolerance policy against those external 
actors who sexually exploit or abuse persons in Haiti in order to prevent cases of misconduct. He 
also requests that all cases are properly investigated and punished. The MINUSTAH mission for 
human rights protection is reaffirmed as being the essential element to stability in the nation. A 
continued community violence reduction approach is requested to be coordinated with the 
Haitian government in order to build local stability and capacity. Programs for the control of the 
flow of small arms and development of a registry, as well as a revision of laws on the possession 
of weapons, is requested to be reformed in order to aid law enforcement in counteracting 
violence (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2013).  
Final Analysis 
Haiti has endured hardships from the moment of their conception. They have endured 
slavery, revolts, warlords, gangs, corruption, and natural disasters. It has seen two hundred years 
of destruction and corruption. When comparing the strides made in the ten years that 
MINUSTAH has been enacted, Haiti is vastly becoming a nation of growth and stabilization. A 
rapid overnight change cannot be expected. Changing the organization and processes of an entire 
society takes generations to overcome. MINUSTAH has not only affected change in Haiti but it 
has built and expanded the concept of operations on how peacekeeping missions should be 
conducted in the future. This is shown in Localising Aid: A Whole of Society Approach (Glennie 
& Rabinowitz, 2013) where the WoS process is explained and impressed upon. MINUSTAH is 
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an example of a successful peace support operation because it was able to grow, change and 
expand from its disasters and strife. The helping of people is never a failure. 
Conclusions  
J. Martin Rochester tells us that “there seems to be a feedback, learning process at work 
that moves international law along incrementally” (Rochester, 2012, p. 275). This is certainly 
true when applied to peace support operations. Evaluating peace support operations is necessary 
in order to enhance international policy. The international law used to back peacekeeping 
missions has taken three generations to evolve into the robust peace support operations that are 
utilized to maintain peace and security. This is not a perfected process, but it is a process that is 
continually growing and expanding to accommodate the changing needs of the world today.  
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